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COMPARED WITH THE 1965 RACIAL CONVENTION
LAURA A. DONNER"
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Charter contains general prohibitions against
discrimination on the basis of both sex and race, with a directive for equality
of all people.' Although the Charter does not distinguish between sex and
race, the international community has accorded these classifications different
priorities. Racial discrimination has long been admonished as evil and
morally wrong by nations around the globe, but tolerance continues for
actions and policies constituting discrimination against women.2 This
tolerance is furthered by the attitudes of the governments and organizations
involved in international human rights law-making, which continue to treat
women's rights with less concern and priority than the human rights of other
groups.'
Nowhere is the unequal status of rights more evident than the United
Nations conventions addressing racial and sex discrimination.4 The 1965
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
("Racial Convention") is considered by many to be the most effective
international human rights instrument in existence today. The Racial
Convention has been described as the "only tool for combating racial
discrimination which is at one and the same time universal in reach,
comprehensive in scope, legally binding in character, and equipped with
* Fulbright Scholar, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
1. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 3; 13, lb; 55, c; 76 c.
2. Racial discrimination has violated customary international law for so long, it is now
considered to have achieved the status of jus cogens. Only recently have scholars even
acknowledged the possibility that the prohibition against sex discrimination may violate
customary international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. a (1987).
3. "Because women have not been viewed as a discrete and insular minority in most
societies, they normally have not come within the targeted groups requiring special governmental
assistance to promote their rights." Margaret E. Galey, International Enforcement of Women's
Rights, 6 HUM. RTs. Q. 463, 464 (1984).
4. For purposes of this article, references to sex or gender discrimination should be
understood as limited to discrimination against women. This article, like the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, does not address sex discrimination against men.
5. 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan 4., 1969 [hereinafter Racial Convention].
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"16built-in measures of implementation....
Closely modeled on this successful convention is the 1979 Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women7
("Women's Convention"). The Women's Convention represents an
important step in the effort to end discrimination against women, but has
been disappointing in its ineffectiveness.8 Although the Women's Conven-
tion makes a significant contribution as a comprehensive statement of
women's rights, it has failed to achieve comparable acceptance and respect
of the Racial Convention. Creating a worthwhile and effective instrument
outlawing gender discrimination constitutes an incredible challenge. Yet this
task would not have been as great, nor the resulting instrument's shortcom-
ings as obvious, had the drafters of the Women's Convention not failed to
adopt many of the more powerful aspects of the Racial Convention.
Clearly discrimination on the basis of race and sex are based on different
attitudes and perceptions. Any instrument aimed at eliminating discrimina-
tion must take into account these differences. For that reason, differences
between the Racial and Women's Convention are permitable, even necessary,
to their respective success. But different does not have to mean inferior. In
creating different instruments, the drafters of the Women's Convention
omitted important provisions and mechanisms that were not particular to race
issues. They created a document with much less protection against
discrimination aimed at women than found in its prototype, the Racial
Convention.
This article will explore the weakness of the Women's Convention as
compared to the Racial Convention, focussing on areas in which these two
discrimination conventions differ. These variations include the respective
Conventions' preambles, definitions of discrimination, implementation
mechanisms, reservations regime, and provisions for state responsibilities.
This article asserts that the inadequate provisions and mechanisms in the
Women's Convention, especially as compared to its model the Racial
Convention, reveal a lower priority for women's rights that can be attributed
to the type of discrimination the Convention claims to prohibit.
6. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING
127 (1991).
7. 1249 U.N.T.S. 14, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981 [hereinafter Women's Convention].
8. For general discussions on the Convention's ineffectiveness, see Charlotte Bunch,
Women's Rights as Human Rights: Towards a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q.
486, 496 (1990) ("Within the United Nations, [the Women's Convention] is not generally
regarded as a convention with teeth"); WARWICK McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (1983) ("[lt is a much weaker and more conservative
instrument than some earlier conventions."). But see Robert F. Drinan, CRY THE OPPRESSED:
THE HISTORY AND HOPE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION 47 (1981) (describing the
Women's Convention as the "Magna Carta" of the women's movement).
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I. HISTORY OF THE CONVENTIONS
The process leading to the adoption of both the Racial and Women's
Conventions provides insight into how each group's rights are regarded by
the international community. The Racial Convention moved quickly through
the United Nation's law-making machinery. The international community
was anxious to create a treaty eliminating discrimination on the basis of race.
In contrast, the Women's Convention faced lower levels of enthusiasm from
the United Nations, with some delegates even questioning the need for a
convention outlawing gender discrimination. These different approaches
provide an informative backdrop for understanding why these conventions
enjoy such different levels of effectiveness.
The specific movement towards the Racial Convention began as a
reaction to the wave of anti-semitic behavior which occurred in many
countries in the winter of 1959-60. 9 The General Assembly adopted a
resolution in 1960 condemning these actions as violations of the Charter and
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ordered factual information on
the events, their causes and motivations be collected in order to determine the
most effective measures to prevent such acts.'0 With the information
assembled, the General Assembly in 1961 requested that the Commission on
Human Rights prepare a declaration on the elimination of all forms of
racism.II On November 20, 1963, the General Assembly adopted the U.N.
Declaration on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 12
Responding to the General Assembly's instruction that it give absolute
priority to preparation of a convention on the subject, the Commission
quickly prepared a draft convention by early 1964. During the 1965 session,
the General Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 3
The quick development and adoption of the Racial Convention can be
traced to the strong political support of the African, Asian and other
developing states. These nations played a decisive role in deciding which
rights were given special protection in the form of United Nations conven-
tions.
It is certainly no accident that a convention on religious freedom-a subject
dear above all to certain Western democracies-was brought before the
9. Egon Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 996, 997 (1966).
10. Id. at 997-98.
11. NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FoRMs OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 3-4 (1980).
12. Schwelb, supra note 9, at 999.
13. Id. The General Assembly would have considered the Convention (and probably
adopted it) in 1964 but for a financial dispute that paralyzed the General Assembly's 1964
session. The dispute was over the financing of peace-keeping operations and the application of
Article 19 of the Charter. Schwelb, supra note 9, at 999.
243
3
Donner: Gender Bias in Drafting International Discrimination Conventions:
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
244 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
organs of the U.N. time and time again without success, whereas the
Convention on Racial Discrimination and treaties on apartheid, war crimes
and crimes against humanity-subjects towards which the Western attitude
was distinctly lukewarm, if not downright hostile-were passed by the
Assembly in no time at all. 14
The developing nations did not have the same level of commitment to a
convention outlawing sex discrimination. This lack of commitment was not
surprising; it reflects a long history of discounting the right of women to
equality.
Concern with the elimination of sex-based discrimination is a relatively
new concept in international law. The general status of women was not
considered by an international body until the League of Nations took up the
issue in 1935.1" But it was not until the Charter of the United Nations and
peace treaties concluded after World War II that international instruments
called for equality of the sexes. To implement these mandates for equality,
the United Nations created the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women in
1947. The decades that followed this initial flurry of calls for equality
witnessed little progress in the area of women's rights: the treaties
concluded were generally narrow is scope and not widely ratified. 6
It was the sense of dissatisfaction with the international protection of
women's rights that led to the Women's Convention. On the initiative of the
Eastern Europeans, the Human Rights Commission drafted and the General
Assembly adopted the 1967 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women.' 7 This document represented the first time that the United
Nations approached gender discrimination as a complex problem needing a
broader, more holistic approach. Although the Declaration did not impose
any legal duties, it did focus attention on the need to protect women from
discrimination.
Six years passed before any international group took up the idea of
creating a legally binding convention outlawing discrimination against
women. In 1973, the Commission on the Status of Women called on
member states to submit their views or proposals concerning an international
14. Antonio Cassese, The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 25, 37 (Philip Alston, ed.
1992).
15. Laura Reanda, The Commission on the Status of Women, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 265, 265 (Philip Alston, ed. 1992).
16. The United Nations had adopted other conventions aimed at protecting women's rights,
but these conventions were narrow in scope and did not enjoy widespread attention or adoption.
See, e.g., Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work
of Equal Value, I.L.O. Convention No. 100, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303; Convention on
the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention on Consent to
Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, Dec. 10, 1962, 521
U.N.T.S. 231.
17. For a full drafting history of the Women's Declaration, see U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess.,
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A16678 (1967).
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convention prohibiting discrimination against women."8 For the next six
years, work on the Convention involved preparing drafts, considering
reports, and debating amendments. 9
The extended time it took to produce the Women's Convention resulted
in part from the arguments by some organizations and delegates that a
legally-binding convention was unnecessary in view of treaties already in
existence which protected women's rights.' The International Labor
Organization had serious reservations about the viability of a discrimination
convention protecting women. The ILO argued that if such a treaty was to
be created, it should be expressed in general terms and not overlap the
conventions of other specialized agencies .21 The Women's Convention also
faced significant delay because of the long and painful debate over every
article by working groups of both the Commission on the Status of Women
and the General Assembly.22
As the end of the 1970's approached, the drafting of the Women's
Convention was rushed in order that it be prepared in time for the World
Conference on the U.N. Decade for Women in July 1980.2  Those
preparing the Women's Convention accepted that, although it was a far from
perfect legal instrument, the Convention would constitute a significant
contribution to the Conference.24 Because of this haste and the failure to
heed the need for further discussion and refinement, the Convention adopted
to protect women from discrimination has serious flaws and weakness.
While both the Racial and Women's Conventions began as Declarations,
they followed radically different paths to adoption. The United Nations
greeted the Racial Convention with anxiousness and enthusiasm. Because of
this support, the Racial Convention was adopted less than two years after the
Racial Declaration. In contrast, the General Assembly did not push for the
adoption of the Women's Convention. There was no sense of an urgent need
to protect women from discrimination. The Women's Convention lumbered
on for years in committees and working groups with some even arguing that
there was no need legally binding treaty on the subject. The final push to
18. U.N. Doe. E/CN.61/591.
19. Roberta Jacobson, The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 444, 445 (Philip
Alston, ed. 1992).
20. These treaties included coverage for political rights, discrimination in employment, and
discrimination in education.
21. MCKEAN, supra note 8, at 189-90.
22. Jacobson, supra note 19, at 445.
23. MCKEAN, supra note 8, at 192. Note that while the General Assembly's Third
Committee had 43 meetings to discuss the Racial Convention, they only spent 2 days discussing
the Women's Convention before recommending adoption. Noreen Burrows, The 1979
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1985 NETH.
INT'L L.R. 419, 420 (1985). "Such uncharacteristic speed can be explained either by the
comprehensiveness of the preparatory work or by the Third Committee's relative lack of interest
in the issue or both." Jacobson, supra note 19, at 446.
24. MCKEAN, supra note 8, at 192.
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adopt the Women's Convention came not from the anxiousness to have such
an instrument in place, but rather from a desire to make a symbolic gesture
of adopting a convention at the 1980 Women's Conference.
These contrasting approaches demonstrate the varying degrees of concern
for these two groups which have long been subject to discrimination. The
Racial Convention garnered the attention of the United Nations, achieving
priority status. The Women's Convention was slow to be adopted, and then
only after years of haggling about its need and its breadth.
II. COMPARISONS OF THE TEXT
The Women's Convention is similar to the Racial Convention, 25 with the
treaties containing similarities in organization and substance. Each
convention demands equality for all, with comparable definitions of
discrimination, demands for state action, calls for special procedures, and
establishment of implementation committees. Yet the Women's Convention
departs from many of the more effective approaches taken by the Racial
Convention, resulting in a much weaker instrument. The failure of the
drafters of the Women's Convention to create a discrimination convention
with the same strong provisions as the Racial Convention demonstrates the
continuing view that women do not the require the same degree of protection
against discrimination as do racial minorities.
A. Preamble
In international legal instruments, preambles state the goals and
principles the document is seeking to achieve. A clear and concise preamble
is important as a backdrop for the interpretation and reception of an
international instrument. The Racial and Women's Conventions differ
significantly in the approach and breadth of their preambles, resulting in
different levels of effectiveness.
The preamble in the Racial Convention provides an expressive objective
of the treaty. The preamble states that all human beings are equal before the
law and are entitled to equal protection.26 The preamble goes as far as to
assert that "any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is
scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous."'
The Racial Convention's preamble is decidedly focused and emphatic in
its demand for an end to racial discrimination. The only form of racial
discrimination specifically mentioned is apartheid. The drafters of the Racial
Convention rejected proposals to include condemnation of anti-semitism and
25. Id. at 189.
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nazism.28 The explanation given for their exclusion was that apartheid was
at that time the only instance of racial discrimination practiced as an official
policy of a government.29 This narrow approach concentrates attention on
the elimination of all racial discrimination, not just various manifestations
that have emerged at different times and places in history.
In contrast to this focussed approach, the preamble to the Women's
Convention diverges further from the central issue-the elimination of
discrimination against women-than does the preamble to any other
international human rights instrument.3" Not only does the Women's
Convention call for equal rights for men and women, but attempts to provide
a laundry list of the direct and indirect causes of the present state of
inequality. These factors include the establishment of a new international
economic order, apartheid, the interference of foreign governments with the
domestic affairs of other states, detente, disarmament, self-determination and
development. 3 As one author noted, "[i]ts language is considerably closer
to that of a political declaration than that of an international treaty."32
The inclusion of these remote causes of sex discrimination can be traced
to the official theme given the Decade of the Women: "equality, develop-
ment and peace." 33 This theme recognizes the close link between issues
relating to women and development and peace within the United Nations."'
The inappropriateness of including these causes did not go unnoticed.
The United Kingdom objected that the broad references were "inappropriate
and unprecedented" for a legal instrument. The rest of the delegates
disagreed, asserting that these references were necessary to recognize the
work done during the past few years of the Women's Decade.35
By including these broad goals of humanity within the specific conven-
tion relating to discrimination against women, the preamble of the Women's
Convention does not further the objectives of the Convention. Instead, the
call for an end to all the world's problems is distracting from the true goals
of equality and fairness for women. The Women's Convention would have
been more effective had the drafters followed the example of the Racial
Convention and included a more directed and narrow preamble.
28. Those opposing a specific reference to Nazism in the Convention argued that while
reprehensible, historically there had been other equally repulsive and reprehensible evils.
Proponents for including nazism argues that nazism was the most striking historical instance of
racist doctrines. LERNER, supra note 11, at 24.
29. Id. at 22.
30. Burrows, supra note 23, at 423.
31. Women's Convention, supra note 7, pmbl.
32. Reanda, supra note 15, at 287.
33. Burrows, supra note 23, at 423.
34. Id.
35. MCKEAN, supra note 8, at 192.
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B. Definitions of Discrimination
Another difference between the conventions is their respective definitions
of discrimination. In the Racial Convention, Article 1(1) defines racism as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
The Women's Convention defines discrimination in Article 1 as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
Obviously, the Women's Convention directly modeled its definition of
sex discrimination on the definition of racial discrimination in the Racial
Convention. However, the drafters did deviate from the definition in one
important regard.
The drafters of the Women's Convention omitted the word "preference"
from the first clause indicating types of behavior outlawed by the Conven-
tion. This omission derives from a conscious decision of the drafters." The
result is a more limited definition of discrimination. The omission of the
word "preference" gives employers the right to choose, all things being
equal, a man in preference to a woman for employment." In contrast, such
a preference based on race would be considered within the definition of
discrimination under the Racial Convention. While this difference appears
minute in the text, in application the omission of the word "preference" has
dire implications for women's right to equality.
C. Implementation Provisions
The Racial and Women's Conventions establish committees to supervise
the implementation of their provisions. These committees are key to
maintaining international accountability and reviewing of state parties
progress towards implementing the Conventions' provisos. However, the
Committee established by the Women's Convention possesses much weaker
mandates and mechanisms than the committee created by its model, the
Racial Convention.
Part II of the Racial Convention creates the Committee on the Elimina-
36. Burrows, supra note 23, at 425 (citing U.N. Doc. E/5909).
37. Id. at 425-26.
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tion of Racial Discrimination, or CERD. The Racial Convention gives
CERD three basic functions. First, Article 9 empowers CERD to consider
reports of the state parties as to what steps they have taken to give effect to
the treaty provisions. Second, CERD is authorized by Articles 11-13 to hear
complaints submitted by one state party against another alleging any violation
of the Convention. Third, CERD is permitted by Article 14 to consider
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of the
Convention. CERD meets twice a year for three weeks in Vienna or New
York. 31 While CERD is not a judicial or quasi-judicial body, and thus does
not have the power to absolve or condemn state parties,39 its expansive
authority over reports, state complaints, and individual communications
places it in a powerful position to expose state violations of the Racial
Convention.
The Women's Convention establishes a similar body, the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, or CEDAW, "for the
purpose of considering the progress in implementation of the Convention. "I
Article 20 of the Women's Convention specifies CEDAW's main function:
"to meet for a period of not more than two weeks annually in order to
consider the reports submitted in accordance with article 18 of the present
Convention. 41 The limited authority and inferior procedures as granted by
the Women's Convention interfere with CEDAW's effectiveness as an
international force for eliminating discrimination against women. The
difficulties experienced by CEDAW can be traced to four main problems
with its powers and processes.
First, CEDAW is limited by its inability to consider complaints by state
parties or individual communications. The Convention only grants CEDAW
the authority to examine the regular state reports and make suggestions and
general recommendations.42 This omission is a major inadequacy of the
Women's Convention.43 CEDAW cannot expand the scope of action beyond
the constraints of the reporting system.44 Some argue there was no need to
give CEDAW power over individual complaints because that mechanism is
already available through the Commission on the Status of Women.45 Yet
the individual petition procedures of the Commission were not established
38. Sandra Coliver, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
RIGHTS PRACTICE, SECOND EDITION 173, 176 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1992). Note that since 1986,
several Racial Committee sessions have been canceled because of failure of several state parties
to pay their contribution. Id. at 176-77.
39. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, supra note 6, at 140.
40. Women's Convention, supra note 7, arts. 17, 1.
41. Id. at art. 20, 1.
42. Id. at art. 21.
43. Theodor Meron, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of Discrimination Against
Women, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 216 (1990) [hereinafter Meron, Enhancing the Effectiveness].
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until 1982, three years after adoption of the Women's Convention. 6 In
addition, the Commission began individual petitions only in response to the
large number of sex discrimination cases referred to it by other United
Nations bodies.' The body created to deal with sex discrimination should
have the authority to entertain such allegations. But the limited authority
granted CEDAW by the Women's Convention prevents this logical result.
Second, CEDAW suffers from a lack of information from non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs). Although many NGOs attend the public
meetings to observe, CEDAW does not have any formal role for NGOs to
provide information to the Committee.48 Without detailed information from
other sources, CEDAW must rely on the reports of the state parties, which
often exaggerate or provide only selective information about the state's
accomplishments. There are doubts whether CEDAW has the power to
create a formal role for NGOs because of the failure to authorize such a role
in the Women's Convention.49
Third, CEDAW faces severe time constraints. CEDAW is limited by
the Convention's text to only meet 2 weeks out of the year. This provision
reflects an overzealous attempt to reduce expenditures: no other human
rights treaty organs have been subjected to such time constraints. 0 "The
view that a committee overseeing implementation of the Women's Discrimi-
nation Convention would require considerably less time than CERD needed
for its work is a reflection of the priority assigned to women's human
rights. "I
Every four years, signatory states submit reports to CEDAW on the
legislative, judicial and administrative, or other measures adopted to give
effect to the Convention. 2 With 111 state parties and consideration of an
average of 6 reports per session, it would take about 19 years to review just
one report from each party.53 If either states or nongovernmental organiza-
tions are to take CEDAW's work seriously, it must be able to review
compliance in a timely and meaningful fashion.54 Many state parties have
consistently submitted tardy reports, while other have failed to submit any
reports at all. This noncompliance with the reporting requirements ironically
is the only thing saving the overworked CEDAW from a complete break-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Andrew C. Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 36-37
(1989).
49. Burrows, supra note 23, at 456.
50. Meron, Enhancing the Effectiveness, supra note 43, at 213. In contrast, the Racial
Convention is silent on the time and frequency of meetings, allowing CERD to establish its own
schedule.
51. Byrnes, supra note 48, at 59.
52. Women's Convention, supra note 7, art. 18.
53. Byrnes, supra note 48, at 61.
54. Coliver, supra note 38, at 183.
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down."
Finally, the fourth problem of CEDAW stems from its geographical
isolation from other human rights bodies. CEDAW and the Commission on
the Status of Women are the only treaty bodies not serviced by the United
Nations Human Rights Center in Geneva. 6 Some observers believe the
placement in Vienna was a concession to then-Secretary-General Waldheim,
who wanted to enlarge the United Nations's Vienna office.5 ' The relative
isolation in Vienna of these organizations representing women makes even
informal cooperation with other committees and staffs difficult8 This
isolation affects CEDAW's ability to keep abreast of current human rights
development and to draw on the expertise of those involved in other areas of
human rights .5 Finally, this fragmentation of human rights machinery
results in inadequate attention to discrimination against women and
contributes to the failure of CEDAW to benefit from innovations of the U.N.
mechanisms like special rapporteurs. °
The committee created by the Women's Convention was crippled from
the start by its weak mechanisms and procedures. Without a change in the
enabling provisions of the Women's Convention, CEDAW's prospects for
improved effectiveness in the fight against discrimination against women are
dubious.
D. Reservations
Another important difference between the two discrimination conventions
is their respective approaches to reservations. According to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a reservation is "a unilateral statement
• . . made by a State, when signing, ratifying ... or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State."61 The extent and
scope of reservations significantly alter the legal effect of an international
convention.
The Racial Convention contains very strict rules about the type of
reservations state parties can adopt. Article 20 of the Convention provides
that reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the
55. Byrnes, supra note 48, at 27.
56. Coliver, supra note 38, at 180; see also Sandra Coliver, United Nations Commission on
the Status of Women: Suggestions For Enhancing its Effectiveness, 9 WHITIER L.R. 435, 437
(1987) [hereinafter Coliver, United Nations Commission].
57. Coliver, United Nations Commission, supra note 56, at 437-38.
58. Coliver, supra note 38, at 180.
59. Byrnes, supra note 48, at 60.
60. Meron, Enhancing the Effectiveness, supra note 43, at 215.
61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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convention shall not be allowed.62 The Racial Convention goes on to
declare that reservations will be considered incompatible if at least two-thirds
of the state parties to the Convention object to it.63
This mechanism for regulating reservations has been extremely effective.
With 128 state parties, there are only four reservations that are purported
modifications or exclusions of the obligations assumed under the treaty.6 In
proposing the clause determining incompatibility, the delegate from Ghana
noted that the absence of such a clause "could conceivably nullify the effect
of the Convention ab initio. "65
In contrast, the Women's Convention does not contain any similar
enforceable restrictions on reservations. Although Article 28 provides that
a "reservation incompatible with the object and purposes of the present
Convention shall not be permitted," '" this provision does not provide any
standards for determining incompatibility. In fact, the Legal Advisor to
United Nations opined that not even the Women's Committee is authorized
to determine the incompatibility of reservations.67
This lack of enforceable limits has resulted in the Women's Convention
being one of the most reserved of all human rights instruments. 68 23 out of
the 100 states parties made a total of 88 substantive reservations, with an
additional 25 reservations to the provisions covering dispute settlement.69
In response to this high number and the broad nature of reservations to
the Women's Convention, state parties in 1984 sought to incorporate a call
for other state parties views on reservations that would be incompatible with
the text of the ECOSOC resolution on the status of CEDAW. 7° This effort
created considerable tension and contributed to the increased level of division
between state parties to the Women's Convention. The vehemence with
which nations delegations have asserted their right to make reservations has
62. Racial Convention, supra note 5, art. 20, 1. The "object and purpose" criteria
derived from Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention. "The International
Court of Justice used the 'compatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention' as the
criterion for the admissibility of reservations to a Convention which was silent on the question
of reservation." Schwelb, supra note 9, at 1055-56.
63. Racial Convention, supra note 5, art. 20, 1 2.
64. Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on
Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 283 (1991). There are an additional
35 reservations to the dispute resolution provisions. Id.
65. LERNER, supra note 11, at 96. Referring to U.N. Doc. A/Pr. 1406, p. 6. Id.
66. Women's Convention, supra note 7, art. 28, 2.
67. The Women's Committee might, however, "have to comment thereon in its reports in
this context." THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 80
(1986).
68. Rebecca Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 644 (1990).
69. Id. at 644. The reservations to the dispute settlement provisions are expressly approved
by Article 29 of the Women's Convention. There is no such provision in the Racial Convention.
Id.
70. John Quinn, The General Assembly into the 1990's, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 55, 70 (Philip Alston, ed. 1992).
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been particularly acute in relation to the Women's Convention.7' "Some
Islamic delegations have displayed sensitivity to criticism of reservations
lodged by their countries upon ratifying human rights treaties, asserting the
sovereign right to make whatever reservations they regard as appropriate. 7
2
In sum, the weak provisions governing the reservations regime in the
Women's Convention caused not only a high number of states to adopt
expansive reservations, but contributed to the sense of disagreement and
conflict over the meaning and purpose of the Convention. Controversies
over the reservations provisions are distracting from the proper focus of the
state parties-how they can work towards ending discrimination against
women.
E. Obligations of State Parties to Prevent Discrimination
Under the Women's and Racial Conventions, state parties oblige
themselves to take action to prevent discrimination. However, the extent and
explicitness of the obligation is different.
Article 7 of the Racial Convention requires state parties to undertake
"immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching,
education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices
which lead to racial discrimination. "73 This article specifies the object and
purposes of taking state action, as well as the type of activities that should
be utilized to achieve that goal.
In its comparable provision, the Women's Convention calls on states "to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices ... which are based on the
idea of inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes." 74 The article does
not define the measures to be taken or the extent to which behavior patterns
should be changed. 75 "To the lawyer this must be the most problematic of
all the articles of the Convention for it defies analysis." 76  The article
implies that states must actively engage in social engineering of both behavior
and attitudes, but provides no guidance on the extent or nature of these
efforts.
In addition to the obligation to modify their population's attitudes, the
Racial Convention includes an extensive provision outlining measures state
parties must take to eradicate incitement and prohibit racist organizations.
Article 4 provides that states must: (1) condemn all propaganda and
71. In 1987, "Egypt and Tunisia expressed disquiet about operative paragraph 11 of General
Assembly reservation 42/103 which contained a general exhortation to state parties to lift
reservations to international covenants." Id. at 71 n.42.
72. Id. at 71.
73. Racial Convention, supra note 5, art. 7.
74. Women's Convention, supra note 7, art. 5, a.
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organizations based on theories of racial superiority; (2) undertake measures
to eradicate incitement to and acts of discrimination; (3) declare the
dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or hatred illegal; (4) declare
illegal organizations which promote or incite racial discrimination; and (5)
not permit public institutions to promote or incite racial discrimination.'
The reason for the inclusion of this provision can be traced to the tangible
damage suffered because of racial propaganda.7"
Despite the breadth of the provision covering propaganda in the Racial
Convention, the Women's Convention contains no references to outlawing
sexist speech or organizations. The failure to include such a provision may
be because the definition of the type of proscribed organization would be too
difficult.79 Yet, to some degree this same problem is faced by states parties
implementing the Racial Discrimination. Therefore state parties are not
obliged to make groups that advocate discrimination against women illegal.
CONCLUSION
In outlining the differences between these two discrimination conven-
tions, the inadequacies of the Women's Convention are painfully obvious.
The Women's Convention is the only comprehensive international instrument
aimed at bringing about equality for women, but it lacks force and respect.
Improvements must be made in the level of protection given to women by
international human rights instruments.
Discrimination is wrong no matter who is the victim. Women deserve
the same level of protection from international human rights instruments as
racial minorities. The adoption of the Women's Convention has been used
by some human rights bodies to justify ignoring the needs of women.'
They assure themselves that because the issue of eliminating discrimination
against women is already addressed in a convention and by a treaty body,
there is less of a need to focus on issues relating to women's equality. But
the international community cannot sit back and dismiss the need for
improvements in its instruments and mechanisms covering the rights of
women. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women represents an important achievement in the area of women's
human rights. But it is important to recognize the nature and causes of its
inadequacies so that the international community can take action in order to
improve and enhance women's rights.
77. Racial Convention, supra note 5, art. 4.
78. Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 283, 296 (1985).
79. Burrows, supra note 23, at 429.
80. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Appreaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 613, 632 (1991).
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